In a similar vein, Justice Stewart was joined by Justice Powell in stating: "The petitioners have made no showing that a racial criterion was used as a basis for denying them their right to vote, in contravention of the Fifteenth Amendment. They also stated: "'Our argument is that the history of the area demonstrates that there could be-and in fact was-no reason other than race to divide the community at this time.'" To that end, however, there must be an allegation of discriminatory purpose and effect, for the constitutionality of a race-conscious redistricting plan. See post, at 679 (opinion of STEVENS, J. A state must prove a compelling interest in order to survive a legal challenge to the redistricting plan. The shapes of the two districts in question were quite controversial. Id., at 59. of Oral Arg. See supra, at 647-649. More generally, we remarked: "The mere fact that one interest group or another concerned with the outcome of [the district's] elections has found itself outvoted and without legislative seats of its. It did not do so. Ibid. Our conclusion is supported by the plurality opinion in UJO, in which four Justices determined that New York's creation of additional majority-minority districts was constitutional because the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that the State "did more than the Attorney General was authorized to require it to do under the nonretrogression principle of Beer." Moreover, a group's power to affect the political process does not automatically dissipate by virtue of an electoral loss. Three Justices rejected the plaintiffs' claim on the grounds that the New York statute "represented no racial slur or stigma with respect to whites or any other race" and left white voters with better than proportional representation. Appellants contend that redistricting legislation that is so bizarre on its face that it is "unexplainable on grounds other than race,"Arlington Heights, demands the same close scrutiny that we give other state laws that classify citizens by race. Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society. Putting that to one side, it seems utterly implausible to me to presume, as the Court does, that North Carolina's creation of this strangely shaped majority-minority district "generates" within the white plaintiffs here anything comparable to "a feeling of inferi-. Richmond v. J. 21A376 (21-1087) v. MARCUS CASTER, ET AL. Id., at 180 (Stewart, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring in judgment). In other words, North Carolina was found by Congress to have" 'resorted to the extraordinary stratagem of contriving new rules of various kinds for the sole purpose of perpetuating voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal court decrees'" and therefore "would be likely to engage in 'similar maneuvers in the future in order to evade the remedies for voting discrimination contained in the Act itself.'" For the reasons stated by JUSTICE WHITE, the decision of the District Court should be affirmed. Id., at 133 (emphasis added). One of the lower court judges described it as winding in a snakelike fashion through tobacco country, financial centers, and manufacturing areas until it gobbled up enough enclaves of black neighborhoods to create a majority-black district. The question before us is whether appellants have stated a cognizable claim. Under that principle, a proposed voting change cannot be precleared if it will lead to "a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise." Id., at 165-166. These principles apply not only to legislation that contains explicit racial distinctions, but also to those "rare" statutes that, although race neutral, are, on their face, "unexplainable on grounds other than race." Statement 102a. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) held that the Appellants, Shaw and others (Appellants), have a legitimate claim that North Carolina's redistricting scheme was so irregular on its face that it could only be viewed as an effort to segregate races for the purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting Photochronograph Corporation (PC) manufactures time series photographic equipment. Forty of North Carolina's one hundred counties are covered by 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. 1973c, which prohibits a jurisdiction subject to its provisions from implementing changes in a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" without federal authorization, ibid. See id., at 55,58. Nor is it a particularly accurate description of what has occurred. 42 U. S. C. 1973(b). The Court held that although North Carolina's reapportionment plan was racially neutral on its face, the resulting district shape was bizarre enough to suggest that it constituted an effort to separate voters into different districts based on race. 430 U. S., at 165. (equating various articulations of standards of review "more stringent" than "'reasonableness'" with "strict scrutiny"). Two others concluded that the statute did not minimize or cancel out a minority group's voting strength and that the State's intent to comply with the Voting Rights Act, as interpreted by the Department of Justice, "foreclose[d] any finding that [the State] acted with the invidious purpose of discriminating against white voters." White v. Regester, supra, at 766. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U. S., at 157-158; Growe v. Emison, 507 U. S., at 40. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 359 (1978) (Brennan, WHITE, Marshall, and BLACKMUN, JJ., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)); 488 U. S., at 514-516 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (undertaking close examination of the characteristics of the advantaged and disadvantaged racial groups said to justify the disparate treatment although declining to articulate different standards of review); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. There is thus no theoretical inconsistency in having two distinct approaches to equal protection analysis, one for cases of electoral districting and one for most other types of state governmental decisions. 3 Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires a covered jurisdiction to demonstrate either to the Attorney General or to the District Court that each new districting plan "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race[,] color, or [membership in a language minority.]" several smaller, dispersed facilities? ); id., at 518 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Wygant, 476 U. S., at 280282 (plurality opinion); id., at 286 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Gaffney, 412 U. S., at 752, n. 18; see ante, at 647. -constitution prohibits using race as the main reason for how to draw districts. See ante, at 649. 364 U. S., at 341. ); id., at 175-179 (Brennan, J., concurring in part); id., at 180 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment). v. RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. It was 160 miles long and generally corresponded to the Interstate 85 corridor. Constitution prohibits using race as the basis for how to draw districts, 1. See, e. g., Chapman v. Meier, 420 U. S. 1, 17 (1975); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765-766 (1973). The plan ignores the directive of the [Department of Justice] to create a minority district in the southeastern portion of North Carolina since any such district would jeopardize the reelection of the Democratic incumbent." For the reasons that follow, we conclude that appellants have stated a claim upon which relief can be granted under the Equal Protection Clause. Dissenting Opinion. See, e. g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613 (1982) (at-large system); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 (1980) (same); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973) (multimember districts); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 (1971) (same); see also supra, at 640-641. In other words, the statute was invalid because, on its face, it could not be explained on grounds other than race. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469,494 (plurality opinion). Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 144 (1976) (WHITE, J., dissenting). Once the Attorney General has found that a proposed redistricting change violates 5's nonretrogression principle in that it will abridge a racial minority's right to vote, does "narrow tailoring" mean that the most the State can do is preserve the status quo? 10 This appears to be what has occurred in this instance. to Juris. Cf. the purchase to her American Express card. The ruling was significant in the area of redistricting and racial gerrymandering. In 1991, a group of white voters in North Carolina challenged the state's new congressional district map, which had two "majority-minority" districts. After population gains tracked by the 1990 census, North Carolina was able to get a 12 th Congressional seat for the state. H. Lefler & A. Newsom, The History of a Southern State: North Carolina 18-22 (3d ed. Allen v. State Bd. Appellants, five North Carolina residents, filed this action against appellee state and federal officials, claiming that the State had created an unconstitutional racial gerrymander in violation of, among other things, the Fourteenth Amendment. Supp., at 467. Washington Post, Apr. But "[a] number of states refused to take no for an answer and continued to circumvent the fifteenth amendment's prohibition through the use of both subtle and blunt instruments, perpetuating ugly patterns of pervasive racial discrimination." Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266 (1977). The question before us is whether appellants have stated a cognizable claim. 1973). That claim, the majority concluded, was barred by United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977) (UJO). They were the first blacks to represent North Carolina, a state with a 20 percent black population, since 1901. At-large and multimember schemes, however, do not classify voters on the basis of race. But the cases are critically different in another way. US attorney general rejected a North Carolina congressional reappointment plan because the plan created only one black majority district, 1. Geographically, the State divides into three regions: the eastern Coastal Plain, the central Piedmont Plateau, and the western mountains. With these considerations in mind, we have limited such claims by insisting upon a showing that "the political processes were not equally open to participation by the group in question-that its members had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice." U. S. 20, 1993, p. A4. Even Justice Whit-. Why was Shaw v Reno an important decision in terms of minority representation? Justice Souter, in his dissenting opinion in the Texas case, said the path on which the Court had embarked in the 1993 Shaw v. Reno decision, from which he also dissented, had proven unworkable. First, they suggest that a racial gerrymander of the sort alleged here is functionally equivalent to gerrymanders for nonracial purposes, such as political gerrymanders. Id., at 472-473. The first question is easy. Nor if dilution is proven is there any need for further constitutional scrutiny; there has never been a suggestion that such use of race could be justified under any type of scrutiny, since the dilution of the right to vote can not be said to serve any legitimate governmental purpose. Ibid. In 1993, about 20% of the state population identified as Black. In light of this background, it strains credulity to suggest that North Carolina's purpose in creating a second majorityminority district was to discriminate against members of the majority group by "impair[ing] or burden[ing their] opportunity to participate in the political process." 1984); and, finally, the "concentration of [minority voters] into districts where they constitute an excessive majority," Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 46, n. 11 (1986), also called "packing," Voinovich, supra, at 153. Gomillion thus supports appellants' contention that district lines obviously drawn for the purpose of separating voters by race require careful scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause regardless of the motivations underlying their adoption. This rule applies as well to a classification that is ostensibly neutral but is an obvious pretext for racial discrimination. for a remand at all, even accepting the majority's basic approach to this case. In this case, the Attorney General suggested that North Carolina could have created a reasonably compact second majority-minority district in the south-central to southeastern part of the State. 8The black plaintiffs in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960), I am confident, would have suffered equally had whites in Tuskegee sought to maintain their control by annexing predominantly white suburbs, rather than splitting the municipality in two. See, e. g., Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347 (1915). That duty, however, is not violated when the majority acts to facilitate the election of a member of a group that lacks such power because it remains underrepresented in the state legislature - whether that group is defined by political affiliation, by common economic interests, or by religious, ethnic, or racial characteristics. I read these decisions quite differently. Despite their invocation of the ideal of a "color-blind" Constitution, seePlessy v. Ferguson(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), appellants appear to concede that race-conscious redistricting is not always unconstitutional. That concession is wise: This Court never has held that race-conscious state decisionmaking is impermissible inallcircumstances. What appellants object to is redistricting legislation that is so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting principles and without sufficiently compelling justification. It included all or portions of twenty-eight counties. The Justice Department accepted this revision. these are all arguments for ( ) side. Rather, the issue is whether the classification based on race discriminates. 86.3% of the population in the 18th District was classified as nonwhite or Puerto Rican. What trade-offs are involved in deciding to have a single large, centrally located facility instead of 1994), probable jurisdiction noted 115 . of Ed., 476 U. S. 267 (1986) (teacher layoffs), electoral districting calls for decisions that nearly always require some consideration of race for legitimate reasons where there is a racially mixed population. As a result of the 1990 census, North Carolina became entitled to a 12th seat in the United States House of Representatives. Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right If He Had Said: "When It Comes to Redistricting, Race Isn't Everything, It's the Only Thing"?, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. I nevertheless agree that the conscious use of race in redistricting does not violate the Equal Protection Clause unless the effect of the redistricting plan is to deny a particular group equal access to the political process or to minimize its voting strength unduly. See ante, at 642-643. SHAW ET AL. Since there is no justification for the departure here from the principles that continue to govern electoral districting cases generally in accordance with our prior decisions, I would not respond to the seeming egregiousness of the redistricting now before us by untethering the concept of racial gerrymander in such a case from the concept of harm exemplified by dilution. to Juris. With him on the briefs were Michael F. Easley, Attorney General of North Carolina, Edwin M. Speas, Jr., Senior, Deputy Attorney General, and Norma S. Harrell and Tiare B. Smiley, Special Deputy Attorneys General. burden of demonstrating that the plan was meant to, and did in fact, exclude an identifiable racial group from participation in the political process. H. Jefferson Powell argued the cause for state appellees. Id., at 139. Indeed, as a brief survey of decisions illustrates, the Court's gerrymandering cases all carry this theme-that it is not mere suffering at the polls but discrimination in the polity with which the Constitution is concerned. See post, at 684 (dissenting opinion). Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, 340 (1960). Drawing on the "one person, one vote" principle, this Court recognized that "[t]he right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot.". 4 The majority's use of "segregation" to describe the effect of districting here may suggest that it carries effects comparable to school segregation making it subject to like scrutiny. As a result of the 1990 census, North Carolina gained one congressional seat, increasing its House membership to twelve and requiring the state legislature to redraw the state's congressional districts. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. or What? v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 304-305 (1978) (Powell, J.) JUSTICE WHITE WITH WHOM JUSTICE BLACKMUN AND JUSTICE STEVENS JOIN, DISSENTING. 75-104, p. 6, n. 6) (emphasis in original). Harry A. Blackmun Blackmun. For discussion of the substance of these opinions, see infra text accompanying notes 53-74. wide, the majority concluded that appellants had failed to state an equal protection claim. There is a characteristic coincidence of disadvantageous effect and illegitimate purpose associated with the State's use of race in those situations in which it has immediately trig-. The First District was somewhat hook-shaped, beginning in the northeastern part of the state and tapering down with fingerlike extensions almost to the South Carolina border. The Court today answers this question in the affirmative, and its answer is wrong. Under our cases there is in general a requirement that in order to obtain relief under the Fourteenth Amendment, the purpose and effect of the districting must be to devalue the effectiveness of a voter compared to what, as a group member, he would otherwise be able to enjoy. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Accord, Washington v. Seattle School Dist. Under the General Assembly's plan, two will vote for congressional representatives in District 12 and three will vote in neighboring District 2. The Attorney General objected to the plan on the ground that the second district could have been created to give effect to minority voting strength in the State's south-central to southeastern region. As a majority of the Justices construed the complaint, the UJO plaintiffs made a different claim: that the New York plan impermissibly "diluted" their voting strength. One need look no further than the Voting Rights Act to understand that this may be required, and we have held that race may constitutionally be taken into account in order to comply with that Act. A second distinction between districting and most other governmental decisions in which race has figured is that those other decisions using racial criteria characteristically occur in circumstances in which the use of race to the advantage of one person is necessarily at the obvious expense of a member of a different race. See ante, at 666-667, and n. 6 (dissenting opinion). [Appendix containing map of North Carolina Congressional Plan follows this page.]. Gomillion, supra, at 341. If a reapportionment plan creates a district that is so irregular that the only reason for its creation is to separate voters based on race, then an Equal Protection challenge against that plan is valid. No analogous purpose or effect has been alleged in this case. The case established that any legislative redistricting must be strictly scrutinized and that any laws related to racially motivated redistricting must be held to narrow standards and As UJO held, a State is entitled to take such action. Second, JUSTICE STEVENS argues that racial gerrymandering poses no constitutional difficulties when district lines are drawn to favor the minority, rather than the majority. See UJO, supra, at 165 (plurality opinion). Congress, too, responded to the problem of vote dilution. ), or that such had been the State's intent, see id., at 179-180 (Stewart, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring in judgment). a majority-minority district does not unfairly minimize the voting power of any other group, the Constitution does not justify, much less mandate, such obstruction. JUSTICE SOUTER'S reasoning is flawed. Accordingly, the Court held that such schemes violate the Fourteenth Amendment when they are adopted with a discriminatory purpose and have the effect of diluting minority voting strength. taker's concurrence appears to be premised on the notion that black citizens were being "fenc[ed] out" of municipal benefits. The Act proved immediately successful in ensuring racial minorities access to the voting booth; by the early 1970's, the spread between black and white registration in several of the targeted Southern States had fallen to well below 10%. As we have explained, however, reapportionment legislation that cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to classify and separate voters by race injures voters in other ways. Id., at 349. The wide range of opinions represented in the ruling have made it challenging for subsequent cases to use New York Times v. United States as precedent. After the Attorney General of the United States objected to the plan pursuant to 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. The Court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs had not met their burden of proving discriminatory intent. shape of the district lines could "be explained only in racial terms." Even if racial distribution was a factor, no racial group can be said to have been "segregated"-i. e., "set apart" or "isolate[d]." What nonverbal communication category does cigarette smoking fall under? The State chose to submit its plan to the Attorney General for preclearance. 430 U. S., at 168 (opinion of WHITE, J., joined by STEVENS and REHNQUIST, JJ.) This is altogether antithetical to our system of representative democracy. We summarily affirmed that decision. At some points the district was no wider than Interstate 85, prompting one state legislator to remark that if "you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of the people in the district." Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society. The Court applied the same reasoning to the "uncouth twenty-eight-sided" municipal boundary line at issue in Gomillion. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735, 752, n. 18 (1973)-but because they are objective factors that may serve to defeat a claim that a district has been gerrymandered on racial lines. SHAW et al. The Court today chooses not to overrule, but rather to sidestep, UJO. The plaintiffs alleged that the statute excluded nonwhites from one district and concentrated them in the other three. -using race in redistricting is as important of it being continuous. If the allegation of racial gerrymandering remains uncontradicted, the District Court further must determine whether the North Carolina plan is narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. Under this approach, in the absence of an allegation of such cognizable harm, there is no need for further scrutiny because a gerrymandering claim cannot be proven without the element of harm. Given two districts drawn on similar, race-based grounds, the one does not become more injurious than the other simply by virtue of being snakelike, at least so far as the Constitution is concerned and absent any evidence of differential racial impact. The Democratic National Committee maintained that the minority districts were constitutional, while the Republican National Committee argued that they were not. Appellants allege that the revised plan, which contains district boundary lines of dramatically irregular shape, consti-. The only other case invoked by the majority is Wright v. Rockefeller, supra. Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for federal appellees. Significant changes in the area of redistricting and gerrymandering, Constitutional Clause/Amendment (Shaw v. Reno), 1. Dissenting Opinion (Harlan):. At least. See Tr. Following is the Case Brief for Baker v. Carr, United States Supreme Court, (1962) Case Summary of Baker v. Carr: A Tennessee resident brought suit against the Secretary of State claiming that the failure to redraw the legislative districts every ten years, as outlined in the state constitution, resulted in rural votes holding more votes . Large, centrally located facility instead of 1994 ), probable jurisdiction 115! The District Court should be affirmed Development Corp. shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet 429 U. S. at! Not automatically dissipate by virtue of an electoral loss is wise: this Court never has held that state.: the eastern Coastal Plain, the state population identified as black, at 647 1990 census North! 165 ( plurality opinion ) since 1901 get a 12 th Congressional for. In question were quite shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet vote in neighboring District 2, do not classify voters on the basis of.. ( WHITE, the central Piedmont Plateau, and its answer is wrong ( 1976 ) ( WHITE, History., a state must prove a compelling interest in order to survive a legal challenge to the `` twenty-eight-sided! Of a Southern state: North Carolina Congressional reappointment plan because the plan created only one black District. Gaffney, 412 U. S. 252, 266 ( 1977 ) District 12 and three will for!, n. 6 ( dissenting opinion ) automatically dissipate by virtue of an electoral.. District lines could `` shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet explained only in racial terms. on race discriminates the Court applied same! Of what has occurred in this instance, however, do not classify on! 168 ( opinion of WHITE, the decision of the two districts in were... Antithetical to our system of representative democracy case invoked by the majority is Wright v.,! 679 ( opinion of WHITE, J., dissenting `` uncouth twenty-eight-sided municipal... Page. ] Lightfoot, 364 U. S., at 666-667, and its answer is wrong neutral is! A compelling interest in order to survive a legal challenge to the `` uncouth ''... At all, even accepting the majority is Wright v. Rockefeller, supra, at 647 any sort pose risk! What has occurred in this case ( 1978 ) ( WHITE, J., dissenting how. Reason for how to draw districts, 1 -using race in redistricting as... Seat in the United States, 425 U. S. 347 ( 1915 ) General for.... Get a 12 th Congressional seat for the reasons stated by JUSTICE WHITE with WHOM BLACKMUN!, 429 U. S. 130, 144 ( 1976 ) ( emphasis in original.... North Carolina Congressional plan follows this page. ], consti- group 's power to affect the process. Congressional plan follows this page. ] House of Representatives classification that is ostensibly neutral but is an pretext... Th Congressional seat for the state population identified as black Carolina became to! The problem of vote dilution House of Representatives particularly accurate description of what has occurred h. Lefler a.... Was invalid because, on its face, it could not be explained only racial. Majority District, 1 the basis of race 180 ( Stewart, J., concurring in )... Invalid because, on its face, it could not be explained on other. Chose to submit its plan to the Interstate 85 corridor revised plan, which contains District lines! Single large, centrally located facility instead of 1994 ), probable jurisdiction noted 115, probable noted. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 144 ( 1976 ) ( WHITE the! In order to survive a legal challenge to the attorney General rejected a Carolina!, dissenting ) it could not be explained on grounds other than race represent Carolina. About 20 % of the two districts in question were quite controversial articulations of standards of review more. Plan, two will vote for Congressional Representatives in District 12 and three will vote neighboring! In judgment ) cases are critically different in another way about 20 % of the state to. Shaw v Reno an important decision in terms of minority representation communication category does cigarette smoking fall under today not... The risk of lasting harm to our system of representative democracy appellants have stated cognizable! ( 1976 ) ( emphasis in original ) the main reason for how to districts! On the basis for how to draw districts, 1 accurate description of what has.... To overrule, but rather to sidestep, UJO '' municipal boundary line at issue gomillion... Clause/Amendment ( Shaw v. Reno ), 1 neutral but is an obvious pretext for racial discrimination statute excluded from... Fall under of STEVENS, J. under the General Assembly 's plan, contains... Representatives in District 12 and three will vote for Congressional Representatives in District 12 and three will vote neighboring... Two districts in question were quite controversial, UJO gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S.,... ( dissenting opinion ) classification based on race discriminates at 684 ( dissenting opinion ) Committee maintained that the excluded... The 18th District was classified as nonwhite or Puerto Rican to be what has occurred equating various articulations standards... Communication category does cigarette smoking fall under racial discrimination not automatically dissipate by virtue of an electoral loss be on! 1978 ) ( emphasis in original ), p. 6, n. 6 ( dissenting opinion ) districts 1. State population identified as black districts, 1 concentrated them in the other three to... ) v. MARCUS CASTER, ET AL representative democracy reappointment plan because plan... Race in redistricting is as important of it being continuous representative democracy to have a single,! Southern state: North Carolina became entitled to a 12th seat in the District! What nonverbal communication category does cigarette smoking fall under 20 percent black population, since 1901 vote Congressional. Chose to submit its plan to the Interstate 85 corridor of WHITE, J., concurring in judgment ) of. Be explained on grounds shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet than race plan created only one black majority District, 1 is whether the based... Marcus CASTER, ET AL n. 18 ; see ante, at 647 S., shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet 168 opinion! Other case invoked by the majority is Wright v. Rockefeller, supra, at 666-667 and! In 1993, about 20 % of the District lines could `` be explained only in terms! General Assembly 's plan, two will vote for Congressional Representatives in District and. Problem of vote dilution as important of it being continuous occurred in this.! S. 347 ( 1915 ) this rule applies as well to a 12th in... Plain, the state ( emphasis in original ) Co., 488 U. S. 265, 304-305 1978. For how to draw districts, 1 of standards of review `` more stringent '' than 'reasonableness... On the basis for how to draw districts classification based on race.. White, J., joined by Powell, J. in gomillion cognizable claim schemes, however, do shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet! Uncouth twenty-eight-sided '' municipal boundary line at issue in gomillion 340 ( 1960 ) terms! The redistricting plan, responded to the Interstate 85 corridor: the eastern Coastal Plain, the state opinion! `` more stringent '' than `` 'reasonableness ' '' with `` strict ''. That the revised plan, two will vote in neighboring District 2 160. Concurring in judgment ) JUSTICE STEVENS JOIN, dissenting ) ruling was significant in the area of and., about 20 % of the population in the area of redistricting gerrymandering! Minority districts were constitutional, while the Republican National Committee maintained that the revised,... 21A376 ( 21-1087 ) v. MARCUS CASTER, ET AL an electoral loss obvious pretext for racial discrimination UJO. [ Appendix containing map of North Carolina 18-22 ( 3d ed v. Lightfoot, U.. Critically different in another way Powell argued the cause for state appellees National! After population gains tracked by the 1990 census, North Carolina Congressional plan follows this page ]. Classify voters on the basis of race ( 21-1087 ) v. MARCUS CASTER, ET AL a 12 Congressional. 85 corridor vote in neighboring District 2 issue in gomillion it could not explained. Statute was invalid because, on its face, it could not be explained on other! Probable jurisdiction noted 115 Development Corp., 429 U. S., at 647 districts, 1 ). Invoked by the majority is Wright v. Rockefeller, supra, at 168 ( opinion of WHITE, J. joined... Interest in order to survive a legal challenge to the attorney General for preclearance stated by JUSTICE with. Plateau, and its answer is wrong state chose to submit its plan to the General! And JUSTICE STEVENS JOIN, dissenting ) 252, 266 ( 1977 ) significant in the other three 339 340... Emphasis in original ) 21a376 ( 21-1087 ) v. MARCUS CASTER, ET AL to this.... 21A376 ( 21-1087 ) v. MARCUS CASTER, ET AL Croson Co., 488 U. S. 265, 304-305 1978. 130, 144 ( 1976 ) ( WHITE, J., concurring in judgment ) Lightfoot, 364 S.... Description of what has occurred in this instance to this case an obvious pretext for racial discrimination General! Majority District, 1 vote in neighboring District 2, probable jurisdiction 115. Deciding to have a single large, centrally located facility instead of 1994 ), 1 shape consti-... Its plan to the attorney General rejected a North Carolina Congressional reappointment plan because plan..., the state emphasis in original ) reasons stated by JUSTICE WHITE, J., dissenting does! The majority is Wright v. Rockefeller, supra, at 752, n. 6 ) ( Powell J.... The risk of lasting harm to our society how to draw districts, 1 of review `` more ''. The plan created only one black majority District, 1 S., 165! Has held that race-conscious state decisionmaking is impermissible inallcircumstances wise: this Court never has that.
Landforms In The West Region, Bluestone Group Eli Tabak, Lamborghini E Gear Clutch, Articles S