All 18 of the witnesses testified at a hearing in Olongapo, Philippines, and their testimony is a matter of public record. The National Security Agency released a paper entitledSkunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2-4 August 1964. Fifty years ago, a controversial confrontation in the Gulf of Tonkin between the United States and North Vietnam forces set the stage for what eventually became US involvement in the Vietnam War. Retiring to South Vietnamese waters, Maddox was joined by the destroyer USSTurner Joy. [25] When a MACV-SOG commando raid was being carried out against Hon Nieu, the ship was 120 miles (190km) away from the attacked area. On the evening of August 4, 1964, President Lyndon Johnson addressed the nation in a televised speech in which he announced that two days earlier, U.S. ships had been attacked twice in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin near North Vietnam. A moderately sanitized version of the overall history[67] was released in January 2008 by the National Security Agency and published by the Federation of American Scientists.[68]. He asserts "I maintain that President Johnson, Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave false information to Congress in their report about US destroyers being attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin. The Johnson administration asserted that the destroyers, the "Maddox" and "Turner Joy", had been on routine patrol in international waters on August 2 when they were fired on by North Vietnamese Torpedo boats. North Vietnamese general Phng Th Ti later claimed that Maddox had been tracked since July 31 and that she had attacked fishing boats on August 2 forcing the North Vietnamese Navy to "fight back". On the night of Aug. 4, the Pentagon proclaimed that a second attack by North Vietnamese PT boats had occurred earlier that day in the Tonkin Gulf a report cited by President Johnson as he went on national TV that evening to announce a momentous escalation in the war: air strikes against North Vietnam. In August 1964, the United States entered the Vietnam War after reports of an unprovoked attack in the Gulf of Tonkin. Tapes included in this release of documents also reveal President Johnson saying, Hell, those damn, stupid sailors were just shooting at flying fish.. [9] In 1995, McNamara met with former People's Army of Vietnam General V Nguyn Gip to ask what happened on August 4, 1964. [20] For the maritime portion of the covert operation, a set of fast patrol boats had been purchased quietly from Norway and sent to South Vietnam. The latest releases, which document skepticism over the pretext for entry into the Vietnam war, date from 1968. . Historians have concluded that the attack never happened and Johnson's ploy is now seen as the quintessential false flag operation. [45] Time reported: "Through the darkness, from the West and south intruders boldly sped at least six of them they opened fire on the destroyers with automatic weapons, this time from as close as 2,000 yards. His actions would lead to the deaths of 58,220 Americans and an untold number of Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians. They stepped up sabotage and hit-and-run attacks on the coast of North Vietnam." The North Vietnamese Communist Party approved a "people's war" on the South at a session in January 1959,[15]:119120 and on July 28, North Vietnamese forces invaded Laos to maintain and upgrade the Ho Chi Minh trail, in support of insurgents in the south. [34], In the face of growing uncertainties over the course of the day regarding whether the attack had occurred, the Johnson administration ended up basing its conclusion that it had mostly on communications intercepts erroneously assessed to be North Vietnamese preparations to carry out an attack and a North Vietnamese after action report. False flags are real and have been used on many occasions to advance nations into war, change regimes or radically sway public opinion. The Gulf of Tonkin incident (or the USS Maddox incident) is the name given to two separate confrontations involving North Vietnam and . "[33][5], "And ultimately it was concluded that almost certainly the [August 4] attack had occurred. Civil Liberties,Privacy,& Transparency Office, Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, & Accessibility, An official website of the United States government, National Security Agency/Central Security Service, Declassification & Transparency Initiatives, Commercial Solutions for Classified Program (CSfC), Diversity, Equity, Inclusion & Accessibility, Col Ralph Steakley, USAF; Chronology of Events Relating to DESOTO Patrol Incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin on 2 and 4 August 1964, Lawrence Levinson, Chronology of Events - Tuesday, 4 August and Wednesday, 5 August 1964 Tonkin Gulf Strike, Lt Col Delmar C. Lang, USAF; Chronology of Events of 18-20 September 1964 in the Gulf of Tonkin, Marshall Wright & Sven Kraemer, Vietnam Information Group; Presidential Decisions- The Gulf of Tonkin Attacks of August 1964, Memorandum by Lt Col Delmar Lang USAF regarding United States Intelligence Board: Special Annex USIB-M-345, Memorandum by NSA General Counsel Banner regarding 16 August 1964 Washington Post article, Memorandum for Commander Naval Security Group from N. Klar. Yoichi Okamoto/U.S. The NSA historian said agency staff "deliberately skewed" the evidence to make it appear that an attack had occurred. The first missions in the Tonkin Gulf began in February 1964. He asked for further details on time, weather and surface conditions. Any truth to this claim? It covers everything.. Theme: Bushwick by James Dinsdale. Still, U.S. intelligence reportedly intercepted messages indicating that the North Vietnamese forces were planning offensive operations on the Tonkin Gulf. Due to the age and poor quality of some of the PDF images, a screen reader may not be able to process the images into word documents. No actual visual sightings by Maddox. [47] On May 4, 1964, William Bundy had called for the U.S. to "drive the communists out of South Vietnam", even if that meant attacking both North Vietnam and communist China. 5 (May 1970), pp. Johnson's statements were short to "minimize the U.S. role in the conflict; a clear inconsistency existed between Johnson's actions and his public discourse. Please help support Dispropaganda by clicking on the "Donate" button and making a. [30] Moreover it officially claimed a 12nmi limit, which is practically identical to the old 20km French claim, after the incidents of August, in September 1964. His actions would lead to the deaths of 58,220 Americans and an untold number of Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians. Questions about the Gulf of Tonkin incident have persisted for more than 40 years. [57], In 1995, retired Vietnamese Defense Minister, V Nguyn Gip, meeting with former Secretary McNamara, denied that Vietnamese gunboats had attacked American destroyers on August 4, while admitting to the attack on August 2. Google searches for "Gulf of Tonkin," June 10-17, 2019. This territorial limit was unrecognized by the United States. As we approach the 51st anniversary of the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, an act that essentially kicked off the "hot" portion of the Vietnam War, we had an opportunity on The Liberty Brothers Radio Show to interview a man who was in the Gulf of Tonkin 51 years ago this week. on the platform of Responsibility to Protect similar to the Gulf of Tonkin. U.S. Navy Naval History and Heritage CommandThe North Vietnamese torpedo boats under fire, as photographed on board the USS Maddox. While Johnson's final resolution was being drafted, U.S. The opinions expressed within the documents in both releases are those of the authors and individuals interviewed. Commander James Bond Stockdale exiting his aircraft. While we cannot be sure whether this is a Gulf of Tonkin . Please Note: These historical documents are PDF images of formerly classified carbon paper and reports that have been declassified. Within 24 hours, though, the Maddox resumed its normal patrolling routine. Prior to the two incidents the U.S. had provided substantial aid to South Vietnam and also had a number of military advisers in South Vietnam. From this point on, the American policy and programs would dominate the course of the Indochina.. Its stated purpose was to . President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara in a cabinet room meeting. After decades of public skepticism and government secrecy, the truth finally came out: In the early 2000s, nearly 200 documents were declassified and released by the National Security Agency (NSA). [12]:11 By 1961, South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem faced significant discontent among some quarters of the southern population, including some Buddhists who were opposed to the rule of Diem's Catholic supporters. Via: ibtimes.co.uk. Maddox, carrying electronic spying gear, was to collect signals intelligence from the North Vietnamese coast, and the coastal attacks were seen as a helpful way to get the North Vietnamese to turn on their coastal radars. That month, this ship was involved in two events collectively referred to as the Gulf of Tonkin incident, which changed the course of modern history in ways that reverberate to this day. [19], A highly classified program of covert actions against North Vietnam, known as Operation Plan 34-Alpha, in conjunction with the DESOTO operations, had begun under the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1961. [34] Although information obtained well after the fact supported Captain Herrick's statements about the inaccuracy of the later torpedo reports as well as the 1981 Herrick and Scheer conclusion about the inaccuracy of the first, indicating that there was no North Vietnamese attack that night, at the time U.S. authorities and all of the Maddox's crew stated that they were convinced that an attack had taken place. [47], By early afternoon of August 4, Washington time, Herrick had reported to the Commander in Chief Pacific in Honolulu that "freak weather effects" on the ship's radar had made such an attack questionable. Captain Herrick radioed that the USS Maddox was under attack, and U.S. officials ordered nearby aircraft from the USS Ticonderoga to fly in as backup. False Flags Nero Ft. Sumter USS Maine RMS Lusitania Reichstag Fire Pearl Harbor Operation Gladio Operation Paperclip Operation Northwoods Gulf of Tonkin U.S.S. Everyone knew how volatile LBJ was. voted against the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. This table contains record counts based on the codes recorded in the CASUALTY CATEGORY field of theVietnam Conflict Extract Data File. The deeper lesson of the Tonkin Gulf episode is how a group of senior national security officials seeks determinedly through hardball - and even illicit tactics to advance its own war agenda,. [5] As the ships approached from the southwest, Maddox changed course from northeasterly to southeasterly and increased speed to 25 knots.[5]. "[66], Hanyok included his study of Tonkin Gulf as one chapter in an overall history of NSA involvement and American SIGINT, in the Indochina Wars. [30][31] The North Vietnamese stance is that they always considered a 12 nautical mile limit, consistent with the positions regarding the law of the sea of both the Soviet Union and China, their main allies. [63]:4849, On November 30, 2005, the NSA released a first installment of previously classified information regarding the Gulf of Tonkin incident, including a moderately sanitized version of Hanyok's article. [citation needed], In 1962, the U.S. Navy began an electronic warfare support measures (intelligence gathering) program, conducted by destroyer patrols in the western Pacific, with the cover name DESOTO. On August 2, Capt. This release includes a variety of articles, chronologies of events, oral history interviews, signals intelligence (SIGINT) reports and translations, and other related memoranda. The US Navy destroyer had shipping container on its decked fitted out with electronic monitoring equipment gathering radio/radar (signals intelligence) informati. Indeed, this concept is so well-accepted that rules of engagement for naval, air and land warfare all prohibit false flag attacks. As the torpedo boats neared, Maddox fired three warning shots. President Lyndon Johnson had deliberately lied and misled the American public into the Vietnam War when he used the justification of the non existent 4th of August attack on the "Maddox" and "Turner". Included in the release is a controversial article by Agency historian Robert J. Hanyok on SIGINT and the Tonkin Gulf which confirms what historians have long argued: that there was no second attack on U.S. ships in Tonkin on August 4, 1964. [5] The Hanyok article states that intelligence information was presented to the Johnson administration "in such a manner as to preclude responsible decision makers in the Johnson administration from having the complete and objective narrative of events." It was a false alarm, and he soon rescinded the report. Shortly thereafter, radar contact of "several high speed contacts closing in on them" was acquired by the USS Turner Joy, which locked on to one of the contacts, fired and struck the torpedo boat. Additionally, he concluded that many pieces of evidence were carefully picked to distort the truth. No further details were forthcoming. Indeed, false flags are themselves capable of taking on a wide variety of forms - domestic or foreign, small or large, economic or political, and many other designations that can often blur into one another. As Commander James Stockdale, one of the pilots at the Gulf of Tonkin incident, later said, I had the best seat in the house to watch that event, and our destroyers were just shooting at phantom targets there were no PT boats therenothing there but black water and American firepower.. After the skirmish, Johnson ordered Maddox and Turner Joy to stage daylight runs into North Vietnamese waters, testing the 12 nautical miles (22km; 14mi) limit and North Vietnamese resolve. Stockdale recounts the incident at 0:37 seconds in the video below. Undersecretary of State George Ball told a British journalist after the war that "at that time many people were looking for any excuse to initiate bombing". It is not NSA's intention to prove or disprove any one set of conclusions, many of which can be drawn from a thorough review of this material. [36][37] Johnson's speech repeated the theme that "dramatized Hanoi/Ho Chi Minh as the aggressor and which put the United States into a more acceptable defensive posture. "[36] Johnson also referred to the attacks as having taken place "on the high seas", suggesting that they had occurred in international waters. As President and Commander in Chief, he said, it is my duty to the American people to report that renewed hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to order the military forces of the United States to take action in reply., The initial attack on the destroyer Maddox, on August 2, was repeated today by a number of hostile vessels attacking two U.S. destroyers with torpedoes.. [5] In this context, on July 31, Maddox began patrols of the North Vietnamese coast to collect intelligence, coming within a few miles of Hn M island. Afraid of attackers, Captain Herrick sent flash messages to U.S. officials while desperately trying to move the ships out of harms way. "[61] The story discusses Lt. White reading Admiral Stockdale's In Love and War[57] in the mid 1980s, then contacting Stockdale who connected White with Joseph Schaperjahn, chief sonarman on Turner Joy. The U.S. built a fortification 150km inside the Mexican border. [14]:67 A communist-led uprising began against Diem's government in April 1957. 2. All subsequent Maddox torpedo reports are doubtful in that it is suspected that sonarman was hearing the ship's own propeller beat" [sic]. U.S. officials had distorted the truth about the Gulf of Tonkin incident for their own gains and perhaps for Johnsons own political prospects. Increase. Tonkin definition, a former state in northern French Indochina, now part of Vietnam. The decisions made by President Lyndon B. Johnson and his top advisors, and the Congressional debate that ensued, resulted in a resolution . L. Paul Epley/National ArchivesTwo soldiers next to a fallen man during the Vietnam War. [58], In the fall of 1999, retired Senior CIA Engineering Executive S. Eugene Poteat wrote that he was asked in early August 1964 to determine if the radar operator's report showed a real torpedo boat attack or an imagined one. According to his New York Times obit, the elder Morrison "commanded American naval forces in the gulf [of Tonkin] when the destroyer Maddox engaged three North Vietnamese torpedo boats on Aug. 2, 1964. Though LBJ knew there was no second battle, he kept this information secret and beat the drums of war. [11] Hanyok's conclusions were initially published in the Winter 2000/Spring 2001 Edition of Cryptologic Quarterly[63] about five years before the Times article. Instead, through these public releases, we intend to make as much information as possible available for the many scholars, historians, academia, and members of the general public who find interest in analyzing the information and forming their own conclusions. Maddox was under orders not to approach closer than eight miles (13km) from North Vietnam's coast and four miles (6km) from Hon Nieu island. While intelligence collected by DESOTO missions could be used by OPLAN-34A planners and commanders, they were separate programs not known to coordinate mission planning except to warn DESOTO patrols to stay clear of 34A operational areas. Proudly powered by WordPress. Johnson dispatched U.S. planes against the attackers and asked Congress to pass a resolution to . This U.S. retaliation marked the nations first overt military action against the North Vietnamese. contribution. Doubts later emerged as to whether or not the attack against the Turner Joy had taken place. See more. [29], Sharp's claims, however, included some factually incorrect statements. Captain George Stephen Morrison was in command of local American forces from his flagship USSBon Homme Richard. Morse supposedly received a call from an informant who has remained anonymous urging Morse to investigate official logbooks of Maddox. The false flag Gulf of Tonkin Incident Vietnam 75,381 views Dec 22, 2008 613 Dislike Share kikila007 1.71K subscribers President Johnson used an alleged attack by North Vietnamese gun boats. [5] According to Hanyok, "it would be attacks on these islands, especially Hn M, by South Vietnamese commandos, along with the proximity of the Maddox, that would set off the confrontation", although the Maddox did not participate in the commando attacks. The Gulf of Tonkin incident (Vietnamese: S kin Vnh Bc B) was an international confrontation that led to the United States engaging more directly in the Vietnam War.It involved both a proven confrontation on August 2, 1964, carried out by North Vietnamese forces in response to covert operations in the coastal region of the gulf, and a second, claimed confrontation on August 4 . Charleston church shooting. [26] Another P-4 received a direct hit from a five-inch shell from Maddox; its torpedo malfunctioned at launch. "[34] It is likely that McNamara did not inform either the president or Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp Jr. about Herrick's misgivings or Herrick's recommendation for further investigation.